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AN IMPLICIT EXEMPTION, IMPLICITLY 
APPLIED: BLURRING THE LINE OF 
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN LABOR POLICY 
AND ANTITRUST LAW IN HARRIS v. SAFEWAY 
Abstract: On July 12, 2011, in Harris v. Safeway, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that an agreement among employers to share 
profits during a labor union strike did not fall within the non-statutory la-
bor exemption to the antitrust laws and required full rule of reason re-
view. In doing so, however, the court may have discouraged future plain-
tiffs from bringing suit in antitrust labor cases. This Comment argues that 
although the court appropriately denied exemption from the antitrust 
laws, it implicitly applied the exemption by allowing collective bargaining 
peculiarities to control its subsequent antitrust analysis. 
Introduction 
 United States labor and antitrust policies inherently conflict.1 On 
the one hand, antitrust law promotes competition and protects con-
sumers from monopolistic behavior.2 On the other hand, labor law 
permits employees to bypass certain types of competition by protecting 
their rights to organize and to bargain collectively.3 As a result of this 
conflict, and to balance these competing policies, Congress enacted a 
statutory exemption from antitrust laws to permit unions and employ-
ees to engage in certain kinds of anti-competitive behavior.4 Subse-
quently, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a non-statutory labor ex-
emption from antitrust law, which permits certain collective action by 
both employers and employees.5 
 In 2011, in Harris v. Safeway, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile these incompatible policies as 
                                                                                                                      
1 Steven D. Buchholz, Comment & Note, Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers’ 
Ability to Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment After Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football, 81 
Minn. L. Rev. 1201, 1209–11 (1997); Daniel H. Weintraub, 1994–95 Annual Survey of Labor 
and Employment Law—Labor Law, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 305, 305 (1996). 
2 Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1205; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 305. 
3 Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1206; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 305. 
4 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 305. 
5 Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–10; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 305–06. 
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they related to a profit-sharing agreement among employers.6 First, the 
court questioned whether the agreement fell within the non-statutory 
labor exemption, which exempts from antitrust scrutiny agreements 
that are tied to the collective bargaining process.7 Second, after con-
cluding that the agreement was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the 
court examined the depth of antitrust analysis required.8 Yet, in deter-
mining the appropriate antitrust analysis, the court strayed from Su-
preme Court precedent by mandating rule of reason review, thereby 
blurring the line between exempt and non-exempt activity.9 
 Part I of this Comment introduces the facts of Harris v. Safeway and 
outlines the development and application of the non-statutory labor 
exemption.10 Then, Part II discusses the broader impact of the case.11 
Finally, Part III argues that although the court correctly determined 
that the non-statutory exemption did not apply, it implicitly applied this 
exemption through its antitrust analysis, thereby circumventing Su-
preme Court precedent.12 This divergence may prevent future plain-
tiffs from succeeding in cases in which antitrust and labor law inter-
sect.13 
I. Ha ory 
Labor Exemption and Substantive Antitrust Analysis 
(the “Union”) and hoping to mitigate the effects of any resulting 
                                                                                                                     
rris v. Safeway: The Intersection Between Non-statut
A. The Agreement, the Strike, and Subsequent Suit 
 In the summer of 2003, three large California supermarket chains, 
Albertson’s, Ralph’s, and Von’s (collectively, the “Grocers”) formed a 
multi-employer bargaining unit and entered into a Mutual Strike Assis-
tance Agreement (the “Agreement”).14 The Grocers did so anticipating 
the looming expiration of their collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) with local chapters of United Food and Commercial Workers 
 
6 See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–11. 
7 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1129–32. 
8 Id. at 1132–33. 
9 See infra notes 97–124 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 14–63 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 64–96 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 96–124 and accompanying text. 
13 See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1135–39. 
14 Id. at 1122–23. The MSAA also included a fourth grocer, Food 4 Less, which was not 
involved in CBA negotiations with the other three employers but anticipated the need to 
enter into similar negotiations when its own CBA expired several months later. Id. 
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strike.15 Therefore, they included a revenue sharing provision (“RSP”) 
within the Agreement.16 The RSP provided that, in the event of a strike 
against one of the Grocers, the other Grocers would reimburse the im-
pacted Grocer for revenue lost during the strike.17 That reimbursement 
would approximate the extra profits earned by the non-impacted su-
permarkets as a result of the strike.18 
 After negotiations between the Grocers and the Union broke 
down in October of 2003, the Union initiated a strike against Von’s.19 
In accordance with the Agreement, Albertson’s and Ralph’s locked out 
their union employees and the Union then continued to strike against 
Von’s and Albertson’s stores.20 The strike continued for four and a half 
months until the parties agreed on a new CBA.21 At that time, Ralph’s 
reimbursed Von’s and Albertson’s according to the provisions of the 
RSP.22 
 During the strike, the State of California brought suit against the 
Grocers, claiming that the parties’ RSP was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade and therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.23 California, 
hoping to avoid the lengthy proceedings accompanying a full antitrust 
analysis, agreed not to pursue a rule of reason analysis for the con-
tended Sherman Act violation and instead argued that the Agreement 
was a per se violation or, in the alternative, would be impermissible un-
der a quick look review.24 




17 Id. The RSP provided that “any grocer that earned revenues above its historical 
share relative to the other chains during the strike period would pay 15% of those excess 
revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their pre-strike shares.” Id. 
18 Id. 




23 Id. at 1124. The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
24 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124; see id. at 1145–46 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The default 
method of analysis for Sherman Act claims is a rule of reason review in which courts ana-
lyze the specific facts and data of the case to determine whether the activity in question 
unreasonably restrained trade. Id. at 1145–46. When “(a) judicial experience with a par-
ticular class of restraints shows that virtually all restraints in that class operate so as to re-
duce output or increase price; and (b) particularized inquiry into the output or price ef-
fects of such a restraint is not worth its costs,” courts hold the activity a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act and do not engage in the detailed review required by rule of reason 
analysis. 6 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1911a, at 294 
(2d ed. 2005). For example, horizontal price fixing is traditionally considered a per se 
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 After determining that the truncated review process advocated by 
California was not appropriate, the District Court entered final judg-
ment for the Grocers according to the parties’ stipulations not to pro-
ceed to a full rule of reason analysis.25 California appealed, arguing 
that the Agreement violated the Sherman Act under a per se or quick 
look analysis; the Grocers cross-appealed, arguing that the non-
statutory labor exemption applied to the RSP, and therefore relieved 
the Agreement from antitrust review.26 
                                                                                                                     
B. Non-statutory Labor Exemption 
 The statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions to antitrust law 
both arose as attempts to reconcile the often conflicting goals of labor 
and antitrust policies.27 Antitrust policy, governed primarily by the Sher-
man Act, seeks to preserve a competitive economic climate by prohibit-
ing all activity that unreasonably restrains trade.28 Conversely, U.S. labor 
policy, governed by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, aims to 
promote the free flow of commerce by preserving the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively.29 
 Recognizing the potential for difficulty in the implementation of 
these conflicting labor and antitrust policies, Congress created the 
statutory labor exemption through the Clayton Act in 1914 and the 
Norris–LaGuardia Act in 1932.30 The Clayton Act declared that unions 
are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the 
Sherman Act.31 Thus, the Clayton Act restricted courts from granting 
 
violation. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999); United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927). Additionally, when activity does not fall within a 
per se category, courts will sometimes use an abbreviated rule of reason, or “quick look,” 
review when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on cus-
tomers and markets.” Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. 
25 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124. 
26 Id. 
27 Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–11. 
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.” Id. The Sherman Act has been interpreted to pro-
hibit only unreasonable restraints of trade. Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1204. 
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1206. 
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53, 104, 105, 113; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 19.7b (4th 
ed. 2011); Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–11. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 17; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Dylan M. Carson, Note, The 
Browning of Sports Law: Defining the Survival of the Labor Exemption After Expiration of Bargain-
ing Agreements, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1141, 1150–51 (1997). 
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injunctions in disputes between employers and employees.32 Yet, when 
the Court continued to apply the Sherman Act to union conduct, Con-
gress passed the Norris–LaGuardia Act, which prevented court actions 
in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute.33 By reading the 
Clayton, Norris–LaGuardia and Sherman Acts in concert, the Supreme 
Court determined that a union, when acting independently and in its 
own self-interest, does not violate the antitrust laws.34 The Court’s deci-
sion to treat labor union activity as outside the scope of the Sherman 
Act is known as the statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws.35 
 The non-statutory labor exemption is a judicially created doctrine 
that permits anticompetitive agreements, otherwise impermissible un-
der antitrust law, when such agreements exist to promote the collective 
bargaining process.36 Furthermore, the non-statutory labor exemption 
extends the statutory exemption beyond inter-union activity.37 Al-
though the Clayton and Norris–LaGuardia Acts do not exempt agree-
ments between unions and employers or agreements among employers 
from antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has recognized that union-
employer and employers-only agreements should be exempt when 
those agreements are intimately related to collective bargaining among 
the parties.38 Thus, so long as the agreement aims to further collective 
bargaining, the exemption may apply to agreements between unions 
and their employers, as well as agreements among multiple employ-
ers.39 This non-statutory exemption reflects the same policy behind the 
statutory exemption.40 That is, labor policy seeks to promote the crea-
tion of labor unions to allow employees to organize and bargain collec-
tively.41 When this policy comes into conflict with antitrust law, labor 
policy should prevail.42 Although the resulting agreements between 
                                                                                                                      
32 29 U.S.C. § 52; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Carson, supra note 31, at 1150–
51. 
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Lee Goldman, The Labor 
Exemption to the Antitrust Laws: A Radical Proposal, 66 Or. L. Rev. 153, 156–57 (1987). 
34 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231–32 (1941); Hovenkamp, supra note 
30, § 19.7b. 
35 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Carson, supra note 31, at 1152. 
36 See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 
616, 625–26 (1975); Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–
11. 
37 See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
38 Connell, 421 U.S. at 621–22; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b. 
39 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996); Hovenkamp, supra note 30, 
§ 19.7b; Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–11. 
40 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Carson, supra note 31, at 1152. 
41 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Carson, supra note 31, at 1152. 
42 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b; Carson, supra note 31, at 1152. 
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unions and employers or among employers may reduce competition, 
the Court created the non-statutory exemption to antitrust scrutiny to 
protect the collective bargaining process.43 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1996 in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court de-
fined the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption, both limiting 
and expanding its application.44 The Court limited its application by 
permitting anticompetitive conduct only when that conduct fundamen-
tally relates to the collective bargaining process.45 Yet, the Court also 
expanded the non-statutory labor exemption by applying it to an 
agreement exclusively among employers for the first time.46 
 Nonetheless, although the Court applied the non-statutory exemp-
tion to an employers-only agreement, it failed to define the boundaries 
of this new type of application.47 In Brown, the NFL unilaterally imple-
mented a provision that had been proposed, but not agreed to, during 
failed CBA negotiations.48 The Court held the NFL’s behavior exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny because of its fundamental relation to the col-
lective bargaining process.49 The Court cautioned, however, that its de-
cision was not meant to sanction all anticompetitive employer con-
duct.50 Further, it stated that there may be employers-only agreements 
that are unrelated or distant from the collective bargaining process and 
therefore warrant full antitrust scrutiny.51 Yet, the Court did not pro-
vide guidance for determining how distant in time and circumstances 
an employers-only agreement must be to prevent interruption of the 
collective bargaining process.52 
 
43 Connell, 421 U.S. at 621–22; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b. 
44 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; see infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
45 Brown, 518 U.S. at 237. For anticompetitive conduct to be sanctioned, three re-
quirements must be met: (1) the conduct must take place during or immediately after 
collective bargaining; (2) the conduct must grow out of and be directly related to the bar-
gaining process; (3) the conduct must involve a matter that is necessary to address through 
collective bargaining; and (4) the conduct must only concern the parties in the bargaining 
relationship. Id. at 250. 
46 Id.; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 19.7b. 
47 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
48 Brown, 518 U.S. at 234–35. 
49 Id. at 250. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. “Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposi-
tion of terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could be sufficiently dis-
tant in time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process that a rule per-
mitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process.” Id. 
52 Id. 
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C. Levels of Antitrust Analysis 
 Courts employ two primary methods of antitrust analysis depend-
ing on the facts of the case at hand.53 The first—and presumptive—
method for antitrust claims is rule of reason analysis.54 Rule of reason 
analysis requires courts to conduct a detailed analysis of the particular 
conduct at issue, taking into consideration factors such as the nature of 
the industry and industry conditions before and after the conduct 
arose.55 Under this analysis, if the conduct unreasonably restricts com-
petition, then it is unlawful.56 In contrast, a court uses the second 
method—per se analysis—when the court has considerable experience 
with a particular type of restraint such that the restraint’s anticompeti-
tive nature may be presumed without delving into the peculiarities of 
the situation.57 The per se method allows courts to condemn the con-
duct without considering particular market or industry conditions, or 
any justifications or defenses.58 
 It is often difficult to determine whether a given situation should 
be subject to rule of reason or per se analysis.59 Thus, courts have de-
veloped an intermediate mode of examination for these situations.60 
Under “quick look” analysis, courts conduct a truncated rule of reason 
review, considering some specific factors or justifications.61 Quick look 
analysis is usually employed when the conduct facially appears to fit 
within a per se category, but lack of judicial experience with the indus-
try or specific situation at hand warrants some more detailed considera-
tion.62 Courts enjoy wide discretion in their application of quick look 
analysis as there are not any delineated guidelines.63 
                                                                                                                      
53 See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
54 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1133; Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and 
Economics 50–52 (2d ed. 2011); Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 5.6b. 
55 Elhauge, supra note 54, at 50–52; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 5.6b, at 275. 
56 Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1205 n.20. 
57 Elhauge, supra note 54, at 50–52; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 5.6b, at 275–76. 
58 Elhauge, supra note 54, at 50–52; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 5.6b, at 177. “Per se 
rules, which impose antitrust liability without regard to actual anticompetitive effect, are 
usually easy to implement; a plaintiff must show, and the fact finder must determine, noth-
ing more than that the defendant engaged in the practice at issue.” Thomas A. Lambert, 
The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 871, 883 (2011). 
59 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, § 5.6d, at 285. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. § 5.6d, at 285–86. 
63 Id. § 5.6d, at 286. 
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II. Harris as a Benchmark for Application of the  
Non-statutory Labor Exemption 
 Until the Ninth Circuit decided Harris in 2011, few circuit courts 
had addressed the scope of the Supreme Court’s 1996 Brown v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc. decision in any depth.64 For example, in 1996, in Ehredt Under-
ground, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit discussed how far removed in time and circumstances 
an agreement must be to preclude application of the exemption.65 The 
Ehredt court concluded that the collective bargaining process must be 
rendered “defunct” before it would be appropriate for a court to apply 
antitrust scrutiny.66 Therefore, the Ehredt court took an expansive view 
of the non-statutory exemption as applied to employers-only agree-
ments and held that the exemption covered the conduct at issue.67 Yet, 
in doing so, it did not explicitly delineate the boundaries of Brown.68 
                                                                                                                     
 The Ninth Circuit, however, used Harris as an opportunity to de-
fine the boundaries of the non-statutory exemption as applied to em-
ployers-only agreements.69 It held that the RSP did not fall within the 
exemption, and was thus subject to antitrust scrutiny.70 The Harris 
court did so by concluding that Brown should be read narrowly, and by 
considering how the Court’s reasoning in Brown applied to the Grocers’ 
RSP provision.71 The Harris court emphasized that the labor laws did 
not approve of or regulate the RSP.72 Additionally, the RSP did not play 
a significant role in collective bargaining; the RSP concerned the 
product, rather than the labor market; and the collective bargaining 
process would not be hindered by the exclusion of the RSP.73 Finally, 
the Harris court noted that the employers’ inclusion of a grocer in the 
Agreement, Food 4 Less, who was not part of the CBA negotiations, 
 
64 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996); Brady v. Nat’l Football 
League, 644 F.3d 661, 687 (8th Cir. 2011); Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, 
536 F.3d 68, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2008); Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238, 241 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
65 Ehredt, 90 F.3d at 241. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011); see infra 
notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
70 See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1131–32. 
71 Id. at 1128–30. 
72 Id. at 1129, 1131. 
73 Id. at 1129–32. 
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further cautioned against application of the exemption.74 After consid-
ering these factors, the court concluded that application of the anti-
trust laws would not interfere with the bargaining process, and there-
fore, the RSP was sufficiently distant from the collective-bargaining 
process.75 
 After determining that the non-statutory labor exemption did not 
apply to the RSP, the court went on to analyze statutory antitrust liabil-
ity.76 The Harris court reasoned that the RSP was not a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act.77 Although the RSP was a profit-pooling agree-
ment—a type of agreement traditionally condemned as per se illegal 
because sharing profits reduces incentives to compete—the RSP’s lim-
ited and uncertain duration and its exclusion of other competitors 
rendered any anticompetitive effects unclear.78 The court further dis-
tinguished the RSP by reasoning that the Grocers maintained some in-
centive to compete, because they were unsure how long the strike 
would last and thus could not count on the continuance of the profit-
pooling mechanism.79 Additionally, the Grocers still had to compete 
with businesses, like specialty grocery stores Whole Foods and Trader 
Joe’s, which were not part of the RSP agreement.80 Finally, the court 
also determined that these same distinguishing characteristics made a 
quick look analysis inappropriate.81 Therefore, the court determined 
that the case required full rule of reason analysis and affirmed the dis-
trict court judgment in favor of the Grocers according to California’s 
stipulation not to pursue a rule of reason analysis.82 
 The Harris decision is an important application of the Brown non-
statutory labor exemption guidelines.83 First, the decision provides a 
benchmark for judging whether an employers-only agreement is suffi-
ciently close in time and circumstances to the collective bargaining 
process to render it exempt from antitrust scrutiny.84 Under Harris, 
revenue sharing among employers, even when motivated by a desire to 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. at 1131. 
75 Id. at 1129–32 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 250). 
76 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1132. 
77 Id. at 1135–37. 
78 Id. at 1124, 1134–37. 
79 Id. at 1135. 
80 Id. at 1136. 
81 Id. at 1139. 
82 Harris, 651 F.3d at 1139. 
83 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Harris, 651 F.3d at 1129–32. 
84 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Harris, 651 F.3d at 1129–32 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 
250). 
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strengthen the employers’ bargaining position, is not sufficiently re-
lated to the collective bargaining process to justify its categorical re-
moval from antitrust scrutiny.85 
 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to reign in the Supreme 
Court’s extension of the non-statutory exemption reflects the policy 
objectives and history of the exemptions.86 Both statutory and non-
statutory labor exemptions aim to level the playing field between em-
ployees and employers.87 The statutory exemption reflects this policy 
by allowing labor unions to function in their own self-interest without 
concern for antitrust implications.88 Accordingly, when the Supreme 
Court extended the statutory exemption and created an implicit non-
statutory exemption, it did so only to ensure that unions were able to 
negotiate CBAs with employers with the same freedom.89 Thus, an 
agreement solely among employers should only be exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny if it is intimately related to the bargaining process.90 Har-
ris emphasizes that the labor exemptions aim to promote labor unions 
and the collective bargaining activities central to a union’s existence, 
not to promote advantageous conditions for employers.91 Therefore, 
Harris provides practical guidance for other circuits and lower courts to 
follow in applying the Brown factors by giving a concrete example of 
when an employers-only agreement is too far removed from the bar-
gaining process to warrant application of the non-statutory exemp-
tion.92 
 The opinion is also significant for its commentary on how this type 
of agreement should be analyzed under the Sherman Act.93 The court 
concluded that this employers-only Agreement justified a full rule of 
reason analysis.94 As Judge Stephen Reinhardt noted in dissent, how-
ever, profit-sharing agreements enacted by employers have traditionally 
been struck down as per se Sherman Act violations, or quickly rejected 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1129–32. 
86 Id. at 1131–32; see Goldman, supra note 33, at 153–54; Carson, supra note 31, at 
1151–58. 
87 See Goldman, supra note 33, at 153; Brian Coolidge, Casenote, Form over Function: The 
Goals of Labor and Antitrust Laws Sacrificed upon a Collective Bargaining Impasse, Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc., 116 S. CT. 2116 (1996), 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 841, 848 (1997). 
88 See Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1209–10; Coolidge, supra note 87, at 844–48. 
89 See Buchholz, supra note 1, at 1210–11; Coolidge, supra note 87, at 846. 
90 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Harris, 651 F.3d at 1131–32. 
91 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Harris, 651 F.3d at 1131–32. 
92 See Harris, 651 F.3d at 1129–32. 
93 See id. at 1135–37. 
94 Id. at 1138–39. 
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after a truncated quick look review.95 By treating this Agreement differ-
ently and mandating a full rule of reason review, the Ninth Circuit de-
parted from the Supreme Court precedent of using per se or quick 
look review.96 
III. What the Ninth Circuit Got Wrong: An Implicit 
Application of the Non-statutory Labor Exemption 
 The Harris court correctly held that the non-statutory labor ex-
emption did not apply to the Agreement.97 Yet, by permitting labor pol-
icy to control its antitrust analysis, it blurred the line between exempt 
and non-exempt activity, thus discouraging plaintiffs in antitrust labor 
cases from bringing suit, and injecting unnecessary confusion into the 
application of the non-statutory labor exemption.98 Although similar 
profit-pooling agreements are typically rejected under a truncated re-
view process, the Ninth Circuit held that this Sherman Act claim re-
quired full rule of reason analysis.99 As a result, the Ninth Circuit de-
parted from Supreme Court precedent and, in doing so, implicitly 
applied the non-statutory labor exemption that it had explicitly re-
jected earlier in the opinion.100 
 The Harris court correctly held that the Agreement did not fall 
within the non-statutory labor exemption because the Agreement was 
not essential to the collective bargaining between the Union and the 
Grocers.101 Although the Grocers’ Agreement centered on collective 
bargaining with the Union, an employers-only agreement to pool prof-
its during a strike is not essential to maintaining equality among parties 
and promoting successful collective bargaining.102 If anything, the Gro-
cers’ Agreement skewed the balance of power toward the employers, 
the exact situation that these exemptions seek to avoid.103 
 Furthermore, in Harris, the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted a nar-
row interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision, Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc., and preserved the policy behind the non-statutory exemp-
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 1145 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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tion: promoting a fair collective bargaining process and successful col-
lective bargaining agreements.104 Employers could argue that because 
the Agreement lasted only for the duration of the strike and repre-
sented an effort to get the parties back to the negotiating table, it was 
sufficiently related to the collective bargaining process so as to justify 
application of the non-statutory labor exemption.105 Yet, crediting this 
argument would extend Brown too far because it would permit activity 
that reduces the effectiveness of a strike, a result that contradicts the 
policy of promoting union bargaining power vis-à-vis employers.106 
 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit ignored Supreme Court precedent 
supporting a truncated antitrust review and instead held that a full rule 
of reason analysis was necessary.107 Under this precedent, profit-
pooling agreements outside the context of collective bargaining are 
typically regarded as per se violations of the Sherman Act or are quickly 
dispatched under an abbreviated quick look analysis.108 The Harris 
court, however, reasoned that the Grocers’ Agreement warranted a full 
rule of reason analysis because its limited duration and lack of full 
market effect rendered the impact on competition unclear.109 Yet, the 
Agreement’s limited duration and market effect stemmed from the 
Agreement’s relation to the ongoing collective bargaining between the 
Union and the Grocers.110 The duration of the Agreement was tied to 
the duration of a potential strike against the Grocers.111 Additionally, 
the Agreement only concerned Grocers who had existing CBAs with 
the Union that were set to expire and therefore did not affect the rest 
of the supermarket market in Southern California.112 
 By allowing these distinguishing characteristics to control the anti-
trust analysis, the court allowed concern for the peculiarities of the col-
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lective bargaining process to impede its reasoning.113 The court had 
reasoned that not all links between the Agreement and the collective 
bargaining process between the Union and the Grocers were sufficient 
to warrant accommodation of the antitrust laws.114 Thus, the court de-
termined that the non-statutory labor exemption should not attach.115 
Yet, once it made this determination, any concerns related to promot-
ing the collective bargaining process should have been irrelevant to the 
subsequent antitrust analysis because the labor exemptions—not anti-
trust analysis—are the proper vehicles for addressing concerns with 
promotion of collective bargaining.116 As Judge Reinhardt commented 
in dissent, the distinguishing factors may make the Agreement less anti-
competitive than other profit-pooling agreements, but the inherently 
anticompetitive nature of the conduct remains.117 
 Therefore, the majority effectively applied the non-statutory ex-
emption by allowing these distinguishing factors to control its antitrust 
analysis.118 By holding the Agreement subject to antitrust scrutiny, the 
court recognized that any relation between the RSP and collective bar-
gaining was too attenuated to merit exemption.119 Nonetheless, the 
court acted illogically when it subsequently allowed these collective 
bargaining concerns to bleed into its antitrust application.120 The con-
sideration of these collective bargaining concerns motivated the court’s 
decision to require rule of reason review.121 This rule of reason re-
quirement operated in a parallel, albeit less direct, way as application of 
the non-statutory labor exemption would have.122 Although the court 
did not explicitly hold the RSP immune from antitrust scrutiny, it im-
plicitly did so by requiring a rule of reason review that was too long and 
costly for California to pursue.123 The court allowed labor policy to con-
trol its antitrust analysis, blurring the line between exempt and non-
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exempt activity and discouraging plaintiffs in antitrust labor cases from 
bringing suit.124 
Conclusion 
 In Harris, the Ninth Circuit implied that employers-only agree-
ments do not qualify for the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust 
law. Yet, such an application would have resulted in a rejection of the 
agreement under either a per se or quick look analysis. By instead hold-
ing distinguishing factors dispositive and requiring a full rule of reason 
review, the court implied that employers-only agreements made during 
the collective bargaining process do not qualify for exemption, but 
should receive some level of deference in the antitrust review process. 
Without articulating any boundaries to this deference, however, the 
court injected unnecessary confusion into the application of the non-
statutory labor exemption. 
 In this way, the Harris decision sets a dangerous precedent for anti-
trust cases that overlap with labor policy. The decision effectively re-
moves the time and cost-saving mechanisms of per se and quick look 
review as an option in these cases. This result discourages parties to 
these cases from bringing suit out of fear that time and expense will 
preclude a conclusion to the case. The Harris court therefore gives 
preferential treatment to the plight of employers confronted with un-
ion tactics by making it harder for plaintiffs to prevail against them. If 
employers are to be given preferential treatment in these circum-
stances, however, it should be under the direction of labor policy and 
the non-statutory exemption, not antitrust law. 
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